Legislative Overview of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code - A 1971 Perspective by Freese, L. Richard, Jr.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 48 Issue 1 Article 4 
March 2021 
Legislative Overview of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code - A 
1971 Perspective 
L. Richard Freese Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
L. Richard Freese, Jr., Legislative Overview of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code - A 1971 Perspective, 48 
Denv. L.J. 27 (1971). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
A 1971 PERSPECTIVE*
By L. RICHARD FREESE, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
A plethora of commentary has been offered on the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) since its promulgation by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) in August 1968.1 I hesitate to add to that
commentary: the risk is that it will only be a reformulation of
thoughts succinctly stated before. Nevertheless, the invitation
of the Denver Law Journal to comment on the UCCC is irre-
sistible. I have succumbed to the assignment in the hope that
my own experience with the UCCC will reflect a current
overview for a new audience and that this article will allow
publication of a view different from that of Professor Little-
field's. I have intended to phrase my observations for all
who are concerned with this legislation and not just for the
legal profession.
I. UNIFORMITY
The raising of the issue of whether or not it was appro-
priate for the National Conference to promulgate the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code as a "uniform" act provokes several
preliminary thoughts. The National Conference draftsmen are
highly practical men, many of whom are legislators and all
of whom are keenly interested in political and legislative
processes. They knew that uncompromising uniformity is not
possible in the passage of state legislation. To dwell on the
* See editors note p. 1 supra for introduction to this article and a parallel
discussion by Neil 0. Littlefield.
** Partner, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; B.A. 1959, Princeton
University, LL.B. 1962, Harvard University.
1 Recent articles include the transcribed remarks of 21 distinguished speak-
ers at an American Bar Association National Institute on "Consumer
Credit in the Seventies," sponsored by the ABA Section of Corporation,
Bank and Business Law, 26 Bus. LAWYER 753 (1971); Braucher,
Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEMp. L. Q.
313 (1970), where in note 1 is listed a number of prominent articles
published in 1968 and 1969 on the UCCC; and Eovaldi, Private Consumer
Substantive and Procedural Remedies Under State Law, 15 ANTIRruST
BULL. 255 (1970). See also Symposium, Consumer Credit, 8 B. C. IND. &
CoM. L. REv. 387 (1968); Symposium, Consumer Credit Reform, 33 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 639 (1968); Symposium Consumer Credit Reform,
44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1 (1969).
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reasons wny the National Confe.rence chose to promulgate the
UCCC as a "uniform" act is probably wasteful at this junc-
ture.2 Our focus now should be to determine whether uni-
form state regulation of consumer credit practices is viable.
Thus, my thoughts will be directed to considerations which
have come to the fore in the nearly 3 years of legislative ex-
perience with the UCCC.
I believe that the National Conference made an attractive
decision- from a political, economic, and sociological point of
view - when it promulgated the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
as a uniform act.
A first factor in this judgment is that the regulation of
consumer credit seems highly appropriate for "umbrella" treat-
ment or, rather, treatment in one piece of state legislation,
and not by the approach of the past of regulating consumer
credit in a piecemeal fashion through several separate state
statutes directed to each "type" of credit-extending institu-
tion and by piecemeal "consumer protection" statutes, such as
garnishment limitation statutes and statutes limiting the holder
in due course privilege.3 We must recognize the existence of
the anticompetitive overtones of the existing segmented regu-
lation of the credit industry;4 of the "captive administrator"
problem;5 of the uncoordinated, sometimes inconsistent statutes
in the credit area; 6 and of the ability of selected credit institu-
tions to kill piecemeal legislation of the "consumer protec-
tion" variety. Given the presence of these four concerns, the
National Conference's decision to promulgate umbrella regu-
lation was eminently correct if one is concerned with viable
consumer protection in the consumer credit field. Moreover,
as a lawyer, I am exhausted from trying to decipher existing
state laws in this area. It is nearly impossible to advise credit
institutions on how they are to behave under this patchwork
of laws. 7 For example, this unpredictability becomes a seri-
ous handicap to credit institutions in their dealings among
themselves. They are unable to negotiate realistically in the
2 The draftsmen of the UCCC set forth their thinking in their Prefatory
Note, "Uniform Legislation Desirable" (1969 Official Text).
3 See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965); Ben-
field, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-the Usury Headache, 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 819 (1968), and infra note 17.
4 Eovaldi, supra note 1, at 261-68.
5 See p. 42 infra.
6 See Benfield, supra note 3.
7 Credit institutions are often left to guess what the courts may do in in-
terpreting the legal effects of consumer credit dealings.
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purchase and assignment of debt paper. I see no justification
for this continued impairment of the free flow of commerce.
A second factor is that several compelling reasons for
establishing uniformity throughout the United States in the
regulation of consumer credit extension have emerged during
legislative review of the UCCC.8 First, the populace of the
United States is transient. Transient consumers need to know
the ground rules for credit extension. Shopping for credit be-
comes illusory for those consumers who change jurisdictions
frequently unless they are provided with a familiar legal
framework within which they can seek credit. A consumer's
bargaining ability is not enhanced when only the creditor
knows the legal variables within which a debt may be created
and collected. A second, related reason is that consumers
should know what are ,the ground rules when they shop for
credit in states other than their own.10 Third, there are many
benefits to both consumers and creditors in uniform regulation
of the creditors' practices and procedures. Cost efficiencies are
achieved by uniform training of credit personnel, by uniform
forms used in credit transactions, and by uniform standards of
conduct in dealing with consumers." These concerns touch all
creditors, regardless of size. Credit extension is not an insular
affair. Every creditor is dependent upon the network of inter-
relationships with his bank, his national trade association, his
supplier, the manufacturer of his products, or even a national
financial institution which finances his unpaid accounts and
receivables or his lendable funds. Those areas where national
uniformity may tend to increase creditors' efficiencies neces-
sarily should redound to the benefit of the public in permitting
credit extension at lower finance charge level.
These three reasons are the basis for the Congress' con-
clusion that uniform disclosure of credit terms is imperative.
The report of the Federal Reserve Board to Congress in Janu-
ary 1971 on the progress of the Federal Truth in Lending Act
concludes that uniform disclosures made by creditors pur-
suant to that Act are indeed beginning to work.12 Consumers
8 Before legislative experience with the UCCC had occurred, Carl Felsen-
feld examined arguments for and against promulgation of the UCCC
as a uniform act in Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Regulating
Consumer Credit, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 221-36 (1968).
"Id. at 223-26.
10 Id. at 226.
11 Id.
12 BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1970,
at 7-13 (1971); See also Feldman, FTC Enforcement of the Truth in
Lending Act - One Year Later, 26 Bus. LAWYER 835 (1971).
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are becoming more alert to the terms and conditions of credit
extension and are using such knowledge to shop for the best
credit terms.
I know that the reader is tempted to ask: What does this
have to do with the Uniform Consumer Credit Code? I sub-
mit that it has a great deal to do with the Code. The Code's
disclosure provisions were made substantially identical to the
disclosure provisions of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, not
only because inconsistent state disclosure provisions are ren-
dered invalid by the Act, but also because the Code is de-
signed to return enforcement of consumer credit disclosure
laws to a state administrator rather than to leave it at the
federal level under the nine federal agencies designated for
such enforcement under the Act. 13 There is much more to
the story than that, however. The Federal Truth in Lending
Act does not invalidate consistent and additional disclosure re-
quirements. 14 Thus a state legislature may impose further dis-
closures upon the creditor which would require him to make
the delicate judgment of whether or not those additional dis-
closures are inconsistent with the Federal Truth in Lending
and Regulation Z disclosure requirements and, if not, how they
can be fitted into the federal disclosure scheme in a mean-
ingful way.1 5 Any counsel for credit institutions knows that
making these judgments is a nearly impossible task in many
instances. If legislators can only avoid the temptation to
amend or add to the Code's disclosure provisions, disaster will
be avoided. The Code, as drafted, accepts the burden of state
enforcement without sacrificing the obvious benefits of uni-
form disclosure.
Uniformity is also significant in the area of the holder
in due course privilege. Those who buy debt paper need to
know what exposure they may have for claims or defenses
which the buyer may have against the seller. The case law
today is changing in this area. 16 Many financial institutions
find that they have negotiated a purchase price for such
13 Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA) § 123, 15 U.S.C. § 1622
(1970), permits exemption for state-regulated transactions where such
regulation is substantially similar and there is adequate provision for
enforcement. See, Prefatory Note to UCCC (1969 official text) and
UCCC § 1.102, Comment. Inconsistent state disclosure requirements are
invalid under the CCPA § 111 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a); and administra-
tive enforcement is provided in the CCPA § 108, 15 U.S.C. § 1607.
14 CCPA § 111(a) 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a), and § 226.6(b) and (c) of Regulation
Z thereunder.
15 § 226.6(a), (b) and (c) of Regulation Z.




paper based upon reliance on the holder in due course privi-
lege, only to have a court subsequently hold that, because of
the close relationship of the seller and the holder, the holder
is not a holder in due course because he did not purchase the
paper in "good faith."'" Also, consumer debt paper is often
17 Id. In commercial transactions, case-by-case determination of the
legal effects of the transactions is disastrous. Thus predictability, through
fixed rules, becomes almost as important as what the rules actually are.
This is not to imply that § 2.403 and either Alternatives A or B of § 2.204
of the UCCC necessarily are socially beneficial rules. Many financiers
have argued that they will no longer be able to buy consumer debt paper
at an attractive enough price to the dealer - because they must protect
themselves from exposure by requiring higher compensatory accounts,
escrows and the like - to permit sellers to make direct credit extensions
and negotiate the resulting debt paper. The holder in due course privilege
has, however, been severely restricted or eliminated in Massachusetts,
Texas, Oklahoma, Utah, California, and elsewhere and, although no special
studies have been made, the evidence is strong that there have been no
appreciable negative effects on the ongoing pace of creation and nego-
tiation of consumer installment debt paper. Sections 2.403 and 2.404 may,
of course, tend to shift some credit extension to direct lending from
installment credit selling, and thus the lender, by virtue of stricter stand-
ards of credit-worthiness, may well narrow credit availability to the"marginal" debtor. Financiers may also after a period of experience with
the new rules, find that they may be able to make prices and conditions
of their purchases of debt paper more attractive, especially with respect
to those sellers whose products are shown over a period of time to be
reliable or who demonstrate that they are adequate to hold the financier
harmless when strike or nuisance suits are commenced. Regardless of the
evidence that no appreciable negative effects ensue on the free flow of
credit extension, it is a close question whether the financier should be
set up as a policeman of his dealers' trade practices. Two arguments are
normally advanced: (1) the financier is in a better position to know of
and control those practices, and (2) where the dealer has disappeared,
the financier can spread the loss over a wider group and the burden does
not fall exclusively on the injured buyer.
As to (1), in some instances, the buyer may be in a much better
position to appraise the value and reliability of the product he has bought
than the financier, who may not know or be able to know such matters
where a large variety of products are sold by the dealer. A special prob-
lem arises in the credit card area where an issuer, especially a bank, is
one of a large number of banks issuing the same card, whose card cus-
tomers may use the card for purchases from a retailer who was signed
up by a competing bank and with whom the issuer has no direct rela-
tionship; it is naive to assume that this issuer can effectively police that
merchant. Attempts to set up a joint policing mechanism among the
issuer banks suggest anti-trust problems. Perhaps bank card arrange-
ments can be established so ag to place the responsibility on the bank
who signed up the merchant whose practices are the source of the liabil-
ity (barring recoupment from the merchant). Clearly, however, the
institution of §§ 2.403 and 2.404 restrictions create widespread, perhaps
nearly insoluable, problems.
As to (2), although persuasive that it seems very inequitable that
an injured buyer alone should bear the less caused by the unlawful trade
practices of a seller simply because he presumably was the happen-
stance victim, why should that loss be absorbed by a financier who must
reflect it as a penalty upon his owners, employees, and other customers.
If a seller is harming the public, then the resultant loss should truly be
spread over the public fisc, perhaps by some type of government con-
sumer insurance arrangement which would permit the government to
recompense the buyer for his loss and then police the seller so as both
to make the government whole and to terminate the harmful practice.
Finally, if the financier is to be an effective policeman, he must know
exactly the extent of his maximum liability. To leave him exposed to
unlimited consequential damages is an unneeded "in terrorem" weapon
which will simply eliminate all transference of installment paper rather
than introduce the intended policing mechanism.
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bought by financial institutions from sellers in other states.
Uniformity will facilitate such transactions.
The Code's limitations on the use of collateral, 8 its re-
strictions on balloon payments,19 its ban of confessions of
judgment,20 and its restrictions on the deficiency judgments
21
are indicated for uniform treatment by virtue of all three
reasons under the second factor i.e., the transient consumer,
the interstate credit shopper, and creditors' efficiencies. Such
areas as rebates on prepayment 22 and change of terms in re-
volving credit accounts 23 probably are less important to the
first and second reasons but are of substantial significance
with respect to the third.
Because an umbrella bill was indicated and because a sig-
nificant portion of the topics to be covered by the bill were
properly the subject of uniform, national treatment, the Na-
tional Conference had to promulgate a uniform act. Admit-
tedly, there are areas covered by the Code where uniformity
may have only tangential value. It would have been inappro-
priate, however, for the conference to have designated those
few areas where uniformity might not have been appro-
priate as optional areas for enactment. To do so would have
undermined the urgency of passage of comprehensive, inter-
nally consistent, consumer credit regulation. Of course, to the
extent that we can identify those areas where uniformity is
not necessarily appropriate, state legislatures may, arguably,
amend. That task is a delicate one, however, and may be an
elusive one to a busy legislature.
The regulation of garnishment practices may be an area
where uniformity would have de minimis value. It is im-
perative, of course, that creditors be able to collect their debts
where debtors refuse to comply with payment obligations.
Nevertheless, the garnishment vehicle is only one of several
historical devices for debt collection, and the extent of its uni-
form use throughout the United States is relatively unim-
portant as long as the basic ability to collect is preserved
by other available devices.
2 4
is UCCC §§ 2.407-.409.
19 UCCC §§ 2.405, 3.402.
20 UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407.
21 UCCC § 5.103.
22 UCCC §§ 2.210, 3.210.
23 UCCC §§ 2.416, 3.408.
24 See discussion p. 43 infra.
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One related issue inevitably is raised: Why not impose
uniform regulation through Congressional mandate? Present
events suggest that the state regulation is still preferable.2 5
Congress has shown no inclination to act in a coordinated
fashion to enact umbrella regulation; rather, it is piecemeal-
ing and fragmenting the area, both substantively and as to
enforcement. First was the Consumer Credit Protection Act
in 1968, which included the Federal Truth in Lending Act,
directed principally to disclosure of credit terms, including
credit advertising, with nine federal agencies enforcing its
terms,26 and also included new rules as to garnishments. 27 In
1970 Congress enacted a ban on unsolicited credit cards,28 a
limitation on the consumer's liability for a lost or stolen credit
card,29 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.30 Perhaps the Na-
tional Commission on Consumer Finance31 can unify this area,
but the direction of the Commission is as yet unclear. At this
point it appears that prospects for umbrella regulation by
Congress are bleak.
32
Perhaps even more important, federal enforcement seems
inappropriate and impractical. Complaints in the area of con-
sumer credit, for the most part, are small, local, and individ-
ualized. The consumer is wandering in an enforcement maze
when he must turn to the federal bureaucracy whose agents
2. Malcom, Consumer Credit-Probings Into the Future, 26 Bus. LAWYER 899
(1971).
26 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665.
27 Id. § § 1671-1677.
28Id. § 1642.
29 Id. § § 1643-1644.
30Id. § 1681.
31 The National Commission on Consumer Finance was created by Title IV
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act P.L. 90-321 § § 401-07, as amended
P.L. 91-344 on July 20, 1970).
32 The President's Consumer Message of February 24, 1971, contains no
recommendations relating to credit practices. On February 7, 1971, Senator
Proxmire released his "Fair Credit Billing Act" (S. 652) which continues
the piecemealing trend by proposing, as an amendment to the Federal
Truth in Lending Act, a series of new restrictions on credit practices, in-
cluding a requirement that creditors investigate and answer inquiries
about billing errors within 30 days or forfeit the amount in dispute; for-
bidding a creditor to threaten a consumer with an adverse credit rating
while a billing dispute is being investigated; a requirement that creditors
who operate revolving credit plans must mail out monthly statements at
least 21 days prior to the time when the consumer must make a payment
to avoid a finance charge; prohibition of use of the previous balance
method of computing finance charges in revolving charge accounts;
prohibition of a minimum finance charge; and permission of retailers to
offer a cash discount. Rep. Murphy's H.R. 243 would require statements
in revolving credit plans to be mailed in time to permit payment prior
to imposition of a finance charge. And Rep. Jacob's H.R. 821 would im-
pose a national interest charge ceiling of 6 percent per year on any loan
or credit transaction.
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seldom are known or available. Informal disposition of small
consumer credit complaints may be an unreachable goal for
a federal enforcement agency, whose rules necessarily are
attuned to concerns of national, or at least regional, concerns
rather than local and minor concerns.3 3 The consumer, how-
ever, must know to whom to turn and how to get a response,
with the ability to complain to his legislative representative
should agency performance be lax. The more localized the
enforcement, the more likely the efficacious result.
Finally, should the rate ceilings in consumer credit regu-
lation be uniform? 34 The Code draftsmen offer the "competi-
tion" theory. This theory, briefly stated, is that, through the
Code's provisions (disclosure, free entry, fair credit practices)
shopping for credit will be maximized; competition for credit
terms will be sharpened; creditor efficiencies will be stimu-
lated; and thus, the lowest finance charges will be offered, in
most cases below the rate ceilings suggested by the National
Conference, but with sufficient flexibility to permit the credi-
tor to raise those charges in the case of high-risk debtors
making credit available to those who are credit-worthy, regard-
less of their income level.35 Skeptics say that, in light of the
existence of oligopolistic and segmented credit markets, it is
naive to assume that there will ever be viable finance charge
competition. 6 These skeptics often suggest that rate regula-
tion should be based on a "public utility" theory, namely,
that legislatures should examine periodically the costs which
each type of credit incurs and then set a rate which permits
a reasonable return to that institution over and above those
costs.3 7 If the public utility theory is adopted, uniform rates
for all creditors will not occur. Under the competition theory
33 In his consumer legislation recommendations of February 24, 1971, the
President strongly indicated that federal courts and agencies must expend
their energies in areas of broad national concern and that effective state
and local relief vehicles must assume the major responsibility in resolv-
ing consumer disputes. The revitalized FTC is showing how a federal
agency can create new standards of credit practices on a national basis by
promulgation of Trade Regulation Rules: See the FTC's proposed rule,
released on January 21, 1971, relating to preservation of a buyer's claims
and defenses in consumer installment sales; and its proposed rule, sub-
ject to hearings this March giving buyers -three days to cancel door-to-
door sales of goods or services costing mcre than $10.
34 See part V infra.
:35 UCCC § 2.201, Comment.
36 Fritz, 26 Bus. LAWYER 864-66, 873-74 (1971) ; see Fritz, Would the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25 Bus. LAWYER 511
(1970).
37 This argument has been repeatedly suggested in almost every legislative
committee study cf the UCCC. See Warren, Rate Limitations and Free
Entry, 26 Bus. LAWYER 855 (1971).
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rate ceilings should be uniformly high so as not restrict avail-
ability of credit through price-fixing, but exact uniformity of
these ceilings may not be necessary.
II. THE "POLARIZATION OF ATTITUDES" PROBLEM
The National Conference surely intended its promulgation
of the UCCC in August 1968 to be a unifying force in credit
regulation, pulling together all segments of the credit industry
and inducing significant public support. The initial effect in
1968-69 was just the opposite.38 In retrospect, the picture in
broad terms was as follows:
One reaction was the various consumer groups' attack on
the Code in 1968 and 1969. The Consumer Federation of
America and the National Consumer Law Center had both
just gotten off the drawing boards about that time, and vari-
ous new state consumer groups and Legal Services groups
were just becoming aware, through extensive exposure in
the ghetto and elsewhere, of the areas of possible abuse in
credit extension practices which needed legislative attention.
Naturally, most of the consumer organizations which are
visible today did not have a hand in the formulation of the
August 1968 and earlier drafts because they were not then in
existence. This does not, of course, mean that their current
observations were not advanced during the drafting process.
Most of them were carefully reviewed by the draftsmen. The
reaction of these new groups in 1968 and 1969 suggests, per-
haps, a disappointment that they had not been directly in-
volved in the drafting of the Code and a determination to
add some of their own language before widespread adoption
of the Code occurred. Fortunately, sophistication has evolved
within the loose amalgam of "consumer groups" in the last
two years, and responsible voices are being heard which are
leading to an understanding of the creditors' concerns and to
sensible proposals for amendment to the Code.39 The current
38 Braucher, supra note 1, at 322. For a composite of early reactions by
consumer representatives, see "Consumer Viewpoints: Critique of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code," Consumer Research Foundation
(Berkeley, 1969).
39 The most significant development in these regards is the issuance by the
National Consumer Law Center and the Department of Consumer Affairs
of the City of New York on December 17, 1970, of a series of amendments
to the UCCC (Publication # A192-150). This issuance coincides with the
Center's rethinking, if not withdrawal, of its April 1970 draft of a "Na-
tional Consumer Act" which was ill-received by the credit industry:
See Moo, New Consumer Credit Legislation: Which Approach - the
UCCC or the NCA?, 2 URBAN LAWYER 439-59 (1970). An early example
of constructive thinking is James and Fragomen, ,The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V and VI, 57 GEO. L.
J. 923 (1969); Kass, Consumer's View, 26 Bus. LAwYER 847 (1971).
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legislative sessions have seen selected amendments to the Code
offered by the National Consumer Law Center and others
which indicate a considerable lessening of the polarization
dividing "consumer groups" and "creditors' groups" which oc-
curred in 1968-69.40
Professor Littlefield has observed elsewhere that the Na-
tional Conference "battled industry" to produce its August 1968
draft.41 I agree. In light of this "battle" the conference should
not have been stunned by the opposition of many creditor
groups. Thus, in 1969 the virulent opposition of the American
Banking Association 42 was echoed by other credit groups,
except retailing. 43 Within the credit industry since 1969, how-
ever, responsible spokesmen have emerged and a significant
cross-section of credit institutions now supports the UCCC.
44
Fear of change is being overcome and the educational efforts
of the conference are making tangible breakthroughs with
industry.
In short, I see signs that the 1968-69 polarization is on the
wane. We would all like to see the decade of the 70's be a
decade of the consumer, rather than "consumerism." "Consum-
erism" has been a divisive and polarizing force at the ex-
pense of the consumer. Responsible industry is learning, how-
ever, that there are thoughtful proponents of reform in the
consumer credit area and that the intention of these proponents
40 Note 37 supra. See also the Code bill in Connecticut as it was presented
to the Connecticut Legislature by an interim study committee; Colorado
H.B. 1076 (UCCC bill) as amended in the House on March 11, 1971.
41 Littlefield, Consumerism: A Review and Preview, DENVER L. J., Special
Magazine Issue 12 (1971).
42 On July 3, 1968, a staff member of the American Bankers Association
prepared a strong statement opposing the UCCC which was circulated in
late 1968 or early 1969 to state banking associations and, almost without
exception, led those associations into opposition to the UCCC in the 1969
legislative sessions. In a statement prepared for presentation at hearings
on the UCCC before the Massachusetts Legislature on January 29, 1969,
Senator Paul Douglas sharply reacted to this opposition. A notable
exception was banking support in Oklahoma and Utah in 1969 (the only
two states where the UCCC passed in 1969).
43 State consumer finance associations, the American Industrial Bankers
Association (AIBA) and state motor vehicles dealers' associations all
opposed the UCCC in 1969. See, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 112 (1969); Denonn, The Consumer Credit
Code -Bombshell, 22 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. 125 (1968); Harper, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.
53 (1969).
44 Many banks and banking associations now support the UCCC, including
state associations in Connecticut, Indiana (where the UCCC was passed
and signed by the Governor on March 5, 1971), and Wyoming (where
the UCCC was passed and signed by the Governor on February 28, 1971).




is to work toward a more sensitive legal mechanism for the
benefit of the public.
III. EFFECTIVE RELIEF
We should start with a very brief review of the National
Conference's decisions on private relief for violations of the
many provisions of the Code. The basic private relief section
is 5.202, a comprehensive section which sets up various private
recovery rights with respect to violations of most of the pro-
visions of the Code. There are some additional private relief
provisions within the substantive Code sections, such as the
rescission right in the referral sales ban.45 A highly signifi-
cant decision, for our purposes here, is that the Code drafts-
men did not include a specific provision enabling private class
actions for any violation of the Code's provisions but rather
left the issue of whether or not such class actions should be
maintained to existing state law outside the confines of the
Code.4 6 Of course, the Code establishes sophisticated adminis-
trative relief for violations, including cease and desist orders,
temporary restraining orders, preliminary and permanent in-
junctions, and recoupment of excess charges for all debtors
who have paid such excessive charges. 47 This scheme of private
relief has been attacked by some as not sufficiently effective4
We will examine the validity of that criticism.
In April 1969 the United States Supreme Court held that
small class claims could not be aggregated under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 to reach the requisite $10,000 amount in
controversy for federal court jurisdiction. 4 This opinion, for
all practical purposes, excluded consumer class actions from
the federal court system. 50 Subsequent attempts in Congress
to reestablish federal court jurisdiction over small consumer
claims through federal class actions has created a nationwide
45 UCCC § 2.411. Another example is in the home solicitation sales pro-
visions, UCCC §§ 2.501-2.505. See also UCCC §§ 5.107, 5.108, 5.203, 5.204.
46 See UCCC § 6.115, Comment 1.
47 UCCC §§ 6.108-.113.
4 8 Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Eschew
Private Enforcement, 23 Bus. LAWYER 1039 (1968); Spanogle, The UCCC
May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 624 (1968).
49 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
50 Seldom, if ever, will any one consumer claim reach $10,000 in amount.
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dialogue on the appropriateness of the class action as a vehicle
for effective consumer relief.5'
The proponents of extensive use of the class action vehicle
in the consumer area argue that without this vehicle the typi-
cal consumer complaint, small in size, cannot be effectively
pursued through the courts because the costs of such pursuit
would exceed the size of the claim. 2 In other words, no con-
sumer can afford to pay a lawyer to champion his small com-
plaint, and thus he must be permitted to pursue his claim, and
the claims of all others similarly situated, by aggregation of
those claims in a "class" action so that the total judgment will
be sufficiently large to pay the class lawyer an adequate fee
out of that judgment, thus spreading the fee over the total
class claims, while each class claimant will still receive recom-
pense commensurate with the harm. Some critics of the Code
are now saying that the omission of the class action device
within its confines overlooks the vital interrelationship be-
tween the Code's substantive provisions and such effective
relief.
5 3
This emphasis on the class action vehicle is misplaced.
The inclusion of the class action vehicle within the confines of
the Code would not provide more effective relief, if such is
51 Although none were passed, Congress had before it in 1970 a number
of bills which would have reversed in whole or in part Snyder v. Harris.
The administration proposed limited access to the federal courts in
selected enumerated instances and after successful prosecution of the
FTC or Department of Justice (original S. 3201, before amendment in
Senate Committee). Other bills would have permitted federal consumer
class actions, regardless of the size of any one claim. See S. 2246, S. 3092,
S. 1222 (administration bill), H.R. 262, H.R. 5630 and H.R. 14589 91st
Cong. 2d Sess. See Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME
LAwYER 663 (1970). A recent general article is Travers and Landers, The
Consumer Class Action, 18 KANSAS L. REV. 811 (1970). Already the same
bills are appearing before Congress in 1971; the President's Consumer
Message again makes the same recommendation for a limited reversal of
Snyder v. Harris; Sen. Magnuson has offered the bill which came out
of the Senate Commerce Committee last year (S. 984); Rep. Ogden, in
H.R. 1078 91st Cong. 2d Sess. would permit federal class action damage
relief for violation of § 5 of the FTC Act; and the irrepressible Rep.
Eckhardt has just offered a new wonderland bill which includes every
conceivable class action vehicle.
52 See generally A Symposium, Federal Rules 23 -The Class Action, 10
B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 493 (1969); and particularly, the article therein
by Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, Id.
at 501-54. It is not, however, at all clear that consumer class actions are
not maintainable under the class action rules of the states. See, Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 80 (1969). Compare Darra v. Yellow Cab, 67 Cal. 2d 695,
433 P. 2d 732 (1967), with Hall v. Coburn, 26 N.Y. 2d 396, 259 N.E. 2d
720 (1970), (although New York and California have essentially the same
class action rule, Darra permitted a consumer-type class action to be
maintained, whereas Hall did not). See also Holstein v. Montgomery
Ward, CCH Poverty Law Rep. 1 9652 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Illinois,
No. 68, ch. 275 (1969).
53 See Spanogle, supra note 48, at 1045.
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needed. 54 Even from a 1971 perspective, I believe that the
National Conference's decision to omit specific class action en-
ablement was correct.
Accepting for purposes of discussion that a problem does
exist in consumer claims where the cost of litigation to en-
force those claims may exceed the recovery sought, the solu-
tion calls for the creation of (1) a low cost procedure for en-
forcing the claim, (2) a quick resolution of the claim, and (3)
an effective recovery, should the claim be deemed to be valid.
The class action vehicle fails to meet all three criteria. A class
action is an enormous monolith, complex in every respect.55
Proponents of the class action device insist that it can be effec-
tively wielded by the courts to reach ready dispositions of
small claims and that the failure of the class action vehicle to
produce such results is caused by the defendant's determina-
tion to test every edge of the privilege to maintain an action
as a class action.56 In my experience, this is unfair. Because
the mere filing of a class action normally exposes the defendant
to massive liabilities, a class action defendant should be per-
mitted to raise every conceivable consideration relative to the
propriety of the maintenance of the action as a class action.
The safeguards established in Federal Rule 23 must be care-
fully observed if basic fairness and due process are to be
achieved. The court should, inter alia, be sure that a substan-
tial commonality of law or fact exists, that the class action is
the most effective remedy, and that it is truly manageable.
5
54 See note 47 supra.
55 See note 52 supra, and especially the article in the Boston College Sym-
posium, Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View B. C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 493, 515-26; see also Handler, The Shift From Sub-
stantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits - The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1971).
56 See note 52 supra.
57 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3); 39 F.R.D. 98, 102-04 (1966). In a survey
in five large cities for a 6-month period ending on October 31, 1970, the
FTC found (see its release dated November 25, 1970) the following 6
major categories (comprising 48 percent of the total) of consumer com-
plaints, in order of number: (1) failure to deliver merchandise that has
been paid for; (2) Truth in Lending violations; (3) defective work or
services; (4) inferior merchandise; (5) false advertising; and (6) re-
fusal to grant refunds without prior notice that such claims would not
be honored. Except for possibly (2) these are fragmented, individualized
complaints dealing with broken merchandise, bad service, or complaint
adjustment problems. (The FTC survey's findings were also those of a
recent Better Business Bureau study). These individual disputes between
one consumer and one seller lack the commonality requirement and, in
any event, would be hopelessly unmanageable in that the court neces-
sarily would have to try each complaint as a separate cause. See, Hackett
v. General Host (E.D. Pa., July 30, 1970) denying maintenance of a class
action for unmanageability where damages for an alleged class of 11/2
million purchasers of bread in the Philadelphia area were sought based
on an alleged price-fixing conspiracy among the defendants.
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Assurances must be given that the representatives of the class
are adequate and that the judgment, when entered, comports
with the best interests of the class. 8 In order to assure fair-
ness to the defendants, the courts and the parties have neces-
sarily had to expend considerable time and energy, thus fail-
ing to satisfy the need for swift and inexpensive dispositions
of the alleged claims.
Defendants have insisted, with considerable justification,
that the class action vehicle is being misused by plaintiffs'
representatives, who have no thought of the legitimate com-
plaints of the class but rather are interested in either mone-
tary reward and/or harassment of large business units whose
customer group is sufficiently large so that the judgment
rendered will make that recompense dramatically satisfying.
Thus, characteristically, consumer class actions have been
directed against relatively large defendants, in which viola-
tions of technical and highly complex provisions of regula-
tory statutes are often alleged, such as provisions of the Fed-
eral Truth in Lending Act.59 They have not been, and perhaps
cannot be directed against major identifiable areas of con-
sume.r complaints, such as those involving fly-by-nights or
highly individualized sales practices."
Without commenting further on these arguments, it is
quite clear that it all boils down to a failure of the class action
vehicle to meet the problem. Specifically, the class action has
not provided a low-cost procedure for either party in reach-
ing a resolution of disputes. Recoveries have been reached,
if at all, at a snail's pace. Quick resolution is unknown. Even
if the substantive claim is finally determined in favor of the
proponents, recovery is cumbersome. Class membership is
5 8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2); 39 F.R.D. 98, 104-05 (1966). There may be
many consumers who do not wish to pursue technical claims against
business units with whom they are pleased to continue to deal.
5., Hearings before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce
Committee on S. 2246, S. 3092 and S. 3201, 92ND CONG., 2D SEss., at 522-23
(1970) revealed that, except for one case, all class actions brought for
violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act by that date had been filed
against major corporations such as Westinghouse, Sun Oil, Sinclair Oil,
Diner's Club, American Express, Mobil Oil, and Gimbel Bros., based
upon allegedly highly technical infractions. This should be compared
with the generally accepted conclusicn that there has been little compli-
ance with the act in the ghetto. A particularly unwise use of the class
action vehicle is in the recovery of statutory penalties: See, Dole,
Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAwYER,
915 (1971).
60 See note 57 supra. Typical frauds are ithe highly localized, hard-core
frauds such as bait and switch and phony referral plans. See Braucher,




often difficult to define. The costs of calculating the small
amount to which each member of the class is entitled can be
more costly than the amount of the total judgment.'' Often,
ferreting out actual claims in such small amounts is impossible
because of the scant retention of records by either party.
Finally, there are brooding questions, after the class is com-
pleted, of whether res judicata has been achieved and whether
constitutional due process has been satisfied through adequacy
of notice."
2
If the class action mechanism is not suitable for resolving
consumer complaints is the search for effective private relief
vehicles futile? I think not. There are viable alternatives
which have not yet been tested adequately and which merit
serious consideration. Among the alternatives are (1) com-
pulsory arbitration, (2) creation of consumer courts or small
claims courts directed to consumer problems, and (3) addi-
tional administrative enforcement.
The third alternative is the best. The Code draftsmen
apparently knew this and created, within the confines of the
Code, flexible administrative enforcement devices which went
beyond those now existing in most of the credit regulation
laws of the states. Generally unknown in the small loan laws
and retail installment sales acts are the administrative powers
of cease and desist, temporary and permanent injunctions, and
assurances of discontinuance. The cost of administrative en-
forcement is relatively minor when spread over the public
and that cost should be considered a price which we all must
pay for consumer protection in the credit field. Significantly,
the fee structure of the Code actually shifts most, if not all,
of this administrative cost to the credit industry.'64 In the past,
regulatory acts have relied principally on administrative license
revocation, a cumbersome bludgeon which was seldom used
because it sweeps too broadly by eliminating the ongoing value
of the licensee.';:' The more flexible administrative relief per-
mitted in Article 6 of the Code permits the administrator to
1 See Eisen v. Carlisle, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C. J.,
dissenting opinion).
62 See 39 F.R.D. 98, 106-07 (1966), see also Comment, Constitutional and
Statutory Requirements of Notice under Rule 23(c) (2), 10 B.C. IND. &
CoM. L. REV. 571 (1969).
,;3 Compare the provisions of the UCCC § § 6.104-6.113 with the enforcement
provisions of the present small lean laws, the motor vehicle installment
sales laws, and personal property installment sales laws. E.g., COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 73-3-1 etseq.; §§ 13-16-1 etseq.:§ 121-2-1 et seq. (1963).
64 See UCCC § 6.203.
-5 See Braucher, supra note 60, at 911.
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tailor the nature of the relief to the heinousness of the offense.
With expertise which the private counsel will not have, the
administrator should be able to pursue a quicker resolution,
either through the cease and desist procedures, or assurances
for discontinuance, or injunctions and restitution."i The ad-
ministrator can pursue the fly-by-nights or the insubstantial
creditor without concern for monetary reward.
We should not be unaware of the concern expressed by
many that regulatory agencies often become "captives" of the
industry which they regulate. This is a valid concern. The
captive administrator must be made a thing of the past. In
eliminating the "captive" administrator, however, there is a
danger that the administrator will be captured by a new pres-
sure group, such as consumers' league. The proper goal is
for an administrator who attends equally to the legitimate
concerns of the consuming public and of the industry which
he regulates. In the credit area, the Code takes a substantial
step forward in achieving this goal. The Code essentially
eliminates the present segmented regulation of the several
types of credit industries and places them under one adminis-
trator. Competition for the administrator's attention will tend
toward equitable treatment of all. Moreover, the Code pro-
vides for a watchdog Council of Consumer Advisors. ';7 Equally
significant is the fact that consumer groups and public aware-
ness of the need for effective administrative enforcement are
overcoing the lethargy which has permitted the adminis-
trator to he a captive of the industry regulated. '  These new
tensions necessarily tend to render the captive administrator
an historical and fading vestige.
01 greater concern today than the captive administrator
problem is the fact that an administrator necessarily has a
limited budget and must also act with a wider public interest
that necessarily may leave out, now and then, the concerns
of an individual who has a substantive claim for relief. Also,
the administrator may often not be able to act as swiftly as
We would like in the resolution of small consumer complaints.
Sec UCCC §§ 6.108-.113.
UCCC, Part 3, Article 6.
In addition to national groups such as the Consumer Federation of
America and the National Consumer Law Center, local Legal Services
uits. state and local consumers leagues, and FTC-sponsored consumer
protection committees now exist in some cities (those in Boston,




Thus we should pursue, probably on a test basis now, addi-
tional private relief mechanisms, such as arbitration or con-
sumer courts.""
Voluntary arbitration, of course, is already available and
hopefully will grow as business responsibility is heightened.'"
The problem, arguably, will never be fully solved, however,
until consumer complaints must be arbitrated. Arbitration has
many elements of attractiveness. It is quick because it can
be held informally, because it can be easily heard, because it
does not require professional legal involvement, thus eliminat-
ing a significant cost factor, and because it normally is not
subject to appeal. Consumer courts could be created with the
same features. Both the consumer and the creditor would
seem to benefit from such a mechanism, which would promptly
resolve the individual complaint at a low cost. The public
could absorb the costs of the arbitrator or the consumer
court and they could be made available locally. What must
be avoided in these vehicles, at all costs, is the creation of
new procedural monsters, similar to what has evolved in
the workmen's compensation area, which would establish the
problem all over again by forcing up costs so that they exceed
the recovery.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code speaks to many issues
in the area of creditors' rights and remedies. The discussion
here will be directed to the manner in which the Code's new
limitations on existing creditors' rights and remedies relate
to an overall regulatory scheme.
WOn February 26. 1971, a private, non-profit group called the National
Institute for Consumer Justice was formed, with the President's bless-
ing, to study the adequacy of procedures for resolution of private dis-
putes arising out of commercial transactions, to be headed by former
Harvard Law Professor Robert Braucher, who has just left Harvard
and the chairmanship of the National Commission on Consumer Finance
to become an Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
A radical new approach now being discussed which will be tackled no
doubt by the Institute is that the government would pay all loss from
consumer complaints upon mere filing of a claim, with stiff penalties
for filing of false claims; all prosecution of industry for harming the
consumer would be done by the government, and private enforcement
would be unnecessary.
Another way to provide for ability in the consumer to pursue his
individual claim is for the court to assess, as additional damages, the
consumer's attorney's fees (should the consumer win), This can, of
course, also be legislatively provided.
7'The American Arbitration Association is giving high priority to the
increased use of voluntary arbitration in the area of resolution of
consumer disputes.
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The common law and statutory maze which exists today
as to creditors' rights and remedies has been described by
some to be inviolate and indispensable in protecting creditors
against defaulting or malicious debtors.' The Code proposes
to limit or even eliminate some of these "traditional" rights
and remedies.12 Thus, the Code necessarily raises the question
of how far legislatures should go in limiting these "traditional"
rights and remedies.
To those who feel that the status quo is inviolate, it must
be acknowledged that the shape of creditors' rights and rem-
edies has been continually under revision. The small loan
laws of 50 years ago placed new statutory limitations on
lenders7 3 and, more recently, the motor vehicle retail install-
ment sales laws and the personal property installment sales
laws have imposed new limitations on retail credit sales. 4 In
the last few years, several states have enacted in piecemeal
fashion many of the limitations found in the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code.
75
In many and probably most states, however, the UCCC
would impose an extensive new set of limitations on creditors'
rights and remedies. These new limitations would have a very
significant effect. At the time when the creditor makes his
decision to extend credit, he will be forced to rely heavily,
if not totally, on his initial judgment as to the credit-worthi-
ness of the debtor and to decrease his accustomed reliance on
his collection rights and remedies. This shift in reliance, at
first blush, seems reasonable. Rephrased, it means that these
new limitations will require the creditor to sharpen his judg-
ment of the debtor's credit-worthiness at the outset rather
than allow him to be a "lazy" creditor and to extend credit
to the "marginal" debtor, who truly should not have received
credit at all, on the basis of his ability to obtain payment
through legal process. One obvious problem with this effect
is that of protecting the creditor from an unforeseen change
of the debtor's credit-worthy condition.
71 See note 43 supra.
72 See, e.g., UCCC Part 4, Article 2; Part 4, Article 3; and Part 1, Article 5.
73 The Uniform Small Loan Laws created by the Russell Sage Foundation.
74 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-16-1 et seq. and §§ 121-2-1 et seq.
(1963).
75 Nineteen states have enacted cooling-off periods in home solicitation
sales see, Hogan, Cooling-Off Legislation, 26 Bus. LAWYER, 875 (1971).
Maryland (MD. STAT. ANN. Art. 83 § 147), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. Tit.
9, § 2455) and Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244 § 12C), and
most recently, New York, have abolished the holder in due course doc-
trine in consumer credit transactions.
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There mUbL, of course, be placed in the law adequate
vehicles for providing an ability in the creditor to collect an
unpaid debt. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code appears to
be a healthy legislative contribution toward retaining that
ability while tightening up on creditors' rights and remedies
in a sufficient way both to eliminate known abuses and to
require better initial judgments as to credit-worthiness.
There has not yet been enough experience with these deli-
cate balances in the UCCC to know whether more extensive
limitations would cripple the creditor's ability to extend
credit.7" Some critics of the UCCC seem sure that most cred-
itors' remedies could safely be eliminated, and these critics
have suggested, as a rationale, that all such remedies can be
misused. Their view seems to be that a creditor should simply
suffer a total loss if he has made the wrong judgment of
credit-worthiness at the time of the extension of credit, except
where there is a subsequent event (such as loss of employ-
ment) which could not be foreseen. I do not share this view.
I know of no behavioral imperative that credit-worthy debtors
will necessarily repay their debts without effective legal
coercion as the alternative to non-payment.
I agree, of course, that some traditional rights and remedies
have been abused. The Code attacks those abuses. It does
not, however, attack hypothetical abuses. If newly apparent
or overlooked abuses do exist, Code amendments are in order.
A prerequisite to sound legislative rule-making, however,
should be proof that such abuses exist.
V. REGULATION OF RATES
With respect to regulation of rates in the consumer credit
area, the National Conference, taking a daring and perhaps
revolutionary step, proposed institution of a "competition"
theory of rate control and rejected the "public utility" ap-
proach of the past.77 It would seem quite enticing to me, to
accept this competition theory rather than face the constant
machinations of credit oligopolies knocking on my door for rate
increases every time the inflationary spiral increased the costs
of credit extension, particularly in the explosive area of how
much the average man pays for the irresistible urge he has
76 UCCC Prefatory Note, '"Basic Assumptions" (1969 official text).
77 Id; see also, UCCC § 2.201, Comment; Warren, Rate Limitations and
Free Entry (and remarks of a panel), 26 Bus. LAWYER 855 (1971);
Malcolm, Consumer Credit-Probings Into the Future, 26 Bus. LAWYER
899; THE CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL FINANCE LAW, THE REALITIES OF
MAXIMUM CEILINGS ON INTEREST AND FINANCE CHARGES (1970).
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to buy things on credit. As a matter of practice, however,
we have seen that it is very hard for the legislators to over-
come the traditional reliance on the public utility theory.
The National Conference's decision to embrace the com-
petition theory flowed from the congressional commitment to
maximization of credit shopping through uniform disclosure
of credit terms in the enactment of the Federal Truth in
Lending Act.7s The Code, however, carried the Federal Truth
in Lending Act theory forward by opening the doors to new
competition for credit terms through elimination of the legal
bases for existing oligopolies in certain credit markets.7  Thus,
the UCCC incorporated certain devices to insure that its com-
petition theory would work. The Code puts all creditors under
its rate ceilings and permits any creditor, if he chooses, to
operate, in any one or more types of credit extension, such
as the high-risk loan, the credit card sale, the motor vehicle
installment sale, or the sale of small items of merchandise on
credit."' Competitive climate is heightened by new fair credit
practice rules. Competition effectuates maximization of effi-
ciencies in the creditor's operations and requires him to re-
spond to his competitors' lower finance charges.
As noted above, skeptics have asserted that there is a
natural segmentation of credit markets according to types of
credit extension and thus that rate competition among those
types cannot be achieved. ' They proclaim that rate competi-
tion has never worked in the past.83 I believe that this is
untrue. There is evidence that, in the marketing of retail
products on credit, rate competition has long been keen, par-
ticularly in big ticket items, such as in motor vehicle sales.
8 4
It is true that in the small loan area (approximately 8 percent
of the credit market) credit prices have often risen to the
ceilings, but this is probably because those ceilings are often
unrealistically low in light of inflationary costs and because
the small loan market is basically one which deals with high
risk debtors who, in order to retain credit at all, either must
pay the highest lawful rate or go to those who operate out-
- See Committee reports to the Federal Truth in Lending Act.
79 See UCCC § 2.201 Comment 1(3); Warren, supra note 77.
Id. See UCCC § 3.512.
UCCC Prefatory Note, "Basic Assumptions" (1969 official text).
'12 See notes 36 and 37 supra.
s:1 Id.
1'- Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAWYER 777, 782-84 (1971).
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side the law.- The experiences in Utah, during the 2 years
in which the Uniform Consumer Credit Code has been the
law there, suggest that the competition theory has a chance."-
The old public utility theory, at least in the area of retail
sales credit, is a doubtful approach at best. The 50 state legis-
latures could, of course, periodically try to make an agonized
determination of what the costs of credit extension for each
credit group were and then specify an additional reasonable
return on investment by setting a finance charge rate which
would cover both those costs and the return. s - Latest studies
in the revolving sales credit area indicate that at least 2 per
cent a month on the outstanding balance would be needed.s
Legislatures, however, have not found it easy to act as a public
utility commission in the credit area, for there is a widespread
misunderstanding that the costs of credit extension are much
less than what they really are and thus legisalors receive
pressure, based on this misinformation, to impose credit rate
ceilings well below what even the public utility theory would
determine. In the State of Washington, a public referendum
in November 1968 imposed a 1 per cent per month rate ceiling
on revolving charge accounts, and disastrous effects have
resulted to the economy of that state.' In the retail sales
",' Id. Where there is competition and reasonable rate ceilings, the actual
rates in the small lending market will fall below the ceilings. Inter alia
such is the case today in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah.
See STUCKI, UTAH CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT (1970). No study has been
made of the Okahoma experiences-Oklahoma also adopted the UCCC
in 1969-but informal discussions with Oklahomans indicate that compe-
tition is producing the expected effects.
Benfield, Usury Laws and Consumer Credit, 26 Bus. LAWYER 787, 788-89
(1971). Professor Benfield observes that there are practical problems
which make it impossible to set rates on a public utility basis: (1) a
creditor need not serve all comers and thus can always exclude from
the market any person who does not qualify at whatever statutory rate
is established: and (2) the expense structure of the credit industry is
quite different from that of a public utility, including a wide variation
of administrative costs and bad debt losses according to the character of
the customers, the size of the credit extended, and the interplay of the
money market between the controlled market (fixed by usury ceilings),
and the uncontrolled market (over 60 percent of the total market).
Professor Benfield was focusing on the cash lending market, but he
could have added that. in credit selling, there is no feasible way to fix
credit charges by setting rate ceilings, for the seller can always hide
additional charges in inflated cash prices as long as the legislatures do
not fix cash prices also (which they show no signs of doing).
>'NATIONAL RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS
OF DEPARTMENT STORE CREDIT, 24-26 (1969).
In a study made by the Graduate School of Business Administration of
the University of Washington at Seattle, published in late 1970, entitled
"The Impact of a Consumer Credit Interest Limitation Law. Washington
State: Initiative 245." the effects of the one percent per month rate were
found to include a marked decrease in availability of consumer credit,
increased cash prices to cover deficits incurred in extending credit. higher
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
area, to the extent by which the allowable finance charge does
not match the costs of credit extension, those costs must
become part of the cost of the goods sold to all buyers, both
credit buyers and cash buyers, and thus, in a broad sense, the
cash buyer will subsidize the credit buyer by paying, in part,
the cost of the credit buyer's credit." It has always seemed
a mystery to me how a legislature could openly impose this
kind of inequity when the majority of consumers are cash
buyers.'
Lamentably, the public's misunderstanding of the costs of
credit is so deeply set that creditors are beginning to learn
that their own presentation of the facts relative to those costs
are rejected out of hand as mere protestations of the self-
interested. Thus, it is incumbent upon responsible consumer
representatives to take a leadership role and to inform the
public that unrealistically low rates in consumer credit are
detrimental to the public.9 2 Unless consumer representatives
sponsor this understanding immediately, rather than succumb
to the passion of the times, we are faced not only with a legis-
lative stalemate in the consumer credit area but also a break-
down of the consumer credit industry.
In summary, why do we not gamble on the National Con-
ference's rate competition theory. We have everything to lose
from the public utility theory and everything to gain for the
consumer by the competition theory.
Turning to subsidiary issues, some observers have con-
tended that there can be no maximization of credit shopping as
long as the creditor presents one basic credit form to his cus-
tomers on a "take it or leave it" basis. In response, it should
be noted that the cost savings of uniformity in the processing
of complex accounts, particularly revolving charge accounts
where a number of small items are purchased under one con-
down payments, shortened maturities, increased requirement of credit
insurance, and increased product-related fees (formerly given free). A
similar problem in Arkansas is studied in Lynch, Consumer Credit at
Ten Percent Simple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 U. ILL. LAW F. 592 (Winter
1968).
0 Id. See also note 88 supra.
91 Cash buyers are most often those whose income is small, i.e., the poor.
There is no doubt that responsible consumer representatives understand
the dire effects of low rates. The National Consumer Law Center has
carefully omitted offering any amendments to UCCC relative to
rates. Many consumer spokesmen are forthrightly attempting to correct
this misunderstanding, but as yet they have not achieved an acceptance
of their view by organized consumer groups, a necessary prerequisite to
political acceptance of realistic rates. See, Caplovitz, Breakdowns in the
Consumer Credit Marketplace, 26 Bus. LAWYER 795 (1971).
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tract, are substantial. These savings should tend toward the
lowest possible finance charge rate because of heightened effi-
ciency. Elimination of these efficiencies will either make credit
extension in small purchases impossible or undesirable because
of substantially higher costs of credit extension. What is really
needed is strong competition among creditors so that, if a
creditor's forms do not present the best competitive rate, he
will simply lose customers, as he should, until he revises his
standard form to meet his competition. 3
Finally, to those who have argued that restrictively low
rate ceilings should be set in order to cause creditors to deny
credit to the "marginal" debtor, my thought is that this argu-
ment for "low" rates is misguided. Even though the effect of
"low" rates may indeed be to restrict the availability of credit
to those less able to pay, the additional side effects are dras-
tically undesirable. Many poor people are sufficiently credit-
worthy to receive credit in small amounts and yet, where
rates are so low as to eliminate high-risk debtors, they will
be denied any legitimate outlet for their modest needs.9 4 How
else can a welfare mother buy a $50 coat except in install-
ments? The alternative to legitimate credit is credit outside
the law - where $5 is extended for one week at a repayment
of $6 and nonpayment is treated by violence.93 The Wash-
ington state situation has called our attention to other disas-
trous consequences. 6 In short, the marginal credit problem
must be tackled with more subtle weaponry. The UCCC has
chosen to do so by stricter limitations on creditors' rights and
remedies.97 This appears to be the sound approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a 1971 perspective, the efforts of the National Con-
ference in promulgating the UCCC are remarkable. Unfor-
93 Cf. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1971).
94 Part IV supra discusses how the creditor will be required by the UCCC's
"consumer protection" provisions to focus his credit extension decision
on the credit-worthiness of the credit applicant, thereby tending to
eliminate the "marginal debtor." A "marginal debtor" is one who over-
buys on credit. A poor person need not necessarily be a marginal debtor,
as long as he buys on credit commensurate with his ability to pay. The
UCCC "consumer protection" provisions hopefully will require the credi-
tor to make a thorough investigation and an accurate prognostication of
that ability but it should not be the place of statutory rate ceilings to
eliminate availability of credit to the extent of that ability.
95 UCCC Prefatory Note, "Basic Assumptions" (1969 official text). See
also Shay, A Portrait of the Consumer Credit Market, 26 Bus. LAWYER
761 (1971).
96 See note 89 supra.
9'7 These limitations are principally found in UCCC Parts 4 of Articles 2 and
3 and Part 1 of Article 5.
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tunately, the UCCC's legislative potential is often not apparent,
for its themes are complex and subtle, and it deals with one
of the most politically delicate issues of the day. To be in-
volved in the resolution of these issues is an exhilarating,
albeit exasperating, affair.
